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Abstract: The “great recession” has affected labor markets in Euro-area countries in very different ways. This 
chapter documents two important aspects of their response: the impact effect of the recession on the rate of 
unemployment, and the persistence of high unemployment.  We find that countries lie on a trade-off between 
“resilience” and “persistence”: countries where the rate of unemployment is less affected on impact  by output 
shocks (resilience) typically show higher unemployment persistence. We investigate the role of labor and 
product market institutions, and find evidence that more protected markets are associated to more resilience 
at the expense of more persistence. This suggests that implementing front loaded “structural reforms” at times 
of a fiscal consolidation, as many Southern European countries did during the recent crisis, may foster the rise 
in unemployment and possibly undermine the political support for the reforms. When we estimate the 
contribution of  product and labor market reforms to the rise of unemployment in Southern Europe, however, 
we find positive, but relatively small effects that are quickly reversed. 
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Non-Technical  Summary 
Southern European countries went through a very painful process of fiscal consolidation, debt and bank 
restructuring, credit squeeze and recession, and, under pressure from creditors, started an ambitious and 
politically sensitive program of reforms stretching from the public sector to credit, labor, and product markets. 
These countries experienced their worst recession since WWII, with unemployment soaring to unprecedented 
levels. The jury is still out on the role of austerity. Opinions differ also on the role structural reforms( see the 
discussion in the introductory chapter of this book). Some for example, consider that the reforms were 
insufficient, not fully implemented, or were not fully credible, while other critics blame them for being too 
radical,  unfocused, wrongly sequenced, or counter-productive in terms of the short run effects on the 
economy. Given that many adverse shocks were affecting these economies at the same time, it not easy to 
isolate the role, if any, of the reforms.  
 And yet while unemployment soared in all Southern European countries during the crisis, the impact of the 
output squeeze on the labor market as well as the persistence of high unemployment rates differed sharply 
among countries, with Spain and Cyprus displaying the largest short run elasticity of unemployment to output, 
but also the fastest speed of adjustment, and the opposite in Greece, Italy and Portugal.  
 In this paper we analyze the response of the labor markets in the Eurozone. First, we document two important 
aspects of this response: the resilience of unemployment to output shocks, and the persistence of shocks to 
unemployment.  We find that most countries of the Eurozone lie on a trade-off between resilience and 
persistence: countries where the rate of unemployment is less affected on impact, displaying thus higher 
resilience, typically also show higher unemployment persistence.  
In order to isolate the effects of structural reforms on the working of the labor market, we investigate 
empirically the role of employment protection, centralization of wage bargaining  and of product market 
institutions, in affecting unemployment as well as its dynamic response to shocks. We find evidence that more 
protected labor and product markets are characterized by more resilience at the expense of greater 
persistence, while more competitive markets make employment more vulnerable to output shocks but also 
experience a faster recovery.  
We estimate how much product and labor market reforms may have contributed to the rise of unemployment 
in Southern Europe, and/or to the faster/slower recovery, by comparing projection of unemployment gaps  
with an artificial counterfactual of no-reform, obtained by freezing labor and product markets to their pre-2008 
situation.  For Greece we find that the front-loaded labor market reforms introduced since 2010 account for 
one (extra) percentage point rise in the unemployment gap. The effect for other Southern European countries 
are smaller, also in the light of the less pronounced reforms implemented since 2008. The case for Greece is 
interesting because we also find that the reforms significantly entail a faster recovery relative to the counter-
factual scenario, so that after only  two years the rate of unemployment becomes lower and more rapidly 
falling than in the absence of reforms. This is true, although to a lesser extent, also for the other South 
European countries.  
To some extent these results should not come as a surprise: the crisis that hit Southern European countries was 
unprecedented, summing the effects of harsh fiscal consolidations, sudden stops and current account 
reversals, wage deflation, sovereign and banks’ defaults leading to credit crunches and ending in the worst 
recession of the post war era. Employment and unemployment changes were, to a first degree, driven by these 
factors. Our analysis has shown that degree of product and labor market competition can significantly affect 
the short-run resilience and the medium-run persistence of unemployment in these economies.   
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis that started in 2008 hit all Eurozone economies and resulted in a very sharp recession and 
soaring unemployment rates in the area as a whole. The size of the decline in output and jobs, however, was 
markedly different across countries. Southern Europe, Ireland and the Baltic Republics were dramatically hit, 
while other Central and Northern European countries were only mildly touched. Figure 1 shows the impressive 
divergence in unemployment rates between Southern European countries and Ireland, on the one hand, and 
Germany, on the other, where unemployment  actually declined.  The reasons that made the former group 
more vulnerable are well known. Before the crisis, large capital inflows financed very large current account 
imbalances, between 10 to 15 percent of GDP, in Spain, Portugal and Greece (see Figure 2). Foreign borrowing 
translated into  excessive domestic lending, and led to a real estate bubble (in Spain and Ireland), to excessive 
risk taking and bank exposure to private and public debt, and to large explicit and implicit fiscal liabilities for 
sovereigns. In Greece, Italy and Portugal, sluggish productivity growth, fiscal proclivity and political instability 
were crucial sources of vulnerability. A sudden stop in capital flows and a simultaneous segmentation of the 
European inter-bank market gave rise to a run on banks (Ireland, Spain and later Greece) and on sovereign 
debts (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy). The credit crunch and the austerity measures that followed pushed 
these countries into their worst recession of the post-war period. International Financial Institutions, in 
exchange for support, pushed these countries to adopt “structural reforms” while implementing the fiscal 
consolidation measures.  
 
      Figure 1: Unemployment Rates                                       Figure 2: Current Account Deficits % GDP 
 
Source: AMECO Database.                                                                 Notes: Positive values indicate deficits. Source: IMF. 
 
In fact, these reforms programs covered a large variety of measures, broadly aimed at improving the supply-
side of the economy and the efficiency of the public sector: for example reducing entry barriers and de-
regulating product and services markets, reducing firing and hiring cost for firms, de-centralizing wage 
bargaining, reducing  public employment, fighting tax evasion/elusion, reforming the judiciary, eliminating red 
tape, privatizing state assets and companies. The idea behind the new structural reforms “consensus”, 
pioneered by the OECD and later shared by the “troika”, the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF, was 
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that many of the problem-countries were characterized by decades of stagnant productivity growth. A “supply-
side” boost would contrast the recessionary impact of the fiscal squeeze. Many critics of this approach (see for 
example Rodrik 2016), objected that: a) these reforms work only in the long run by raising potential output, so 
that they are ineffective, in if not costly, in the short run; b) reforms should be targeted at removing few, well 
specified constraints to growth, rather than being applied across the board, where they are less likely to be 
effective and more likely to undermine political support 
In this paper we focus on  labor and product markets. First, we document that unemployment rates in the 
Eurozone countries have responded very differently to the “great recession”. We focus on two dimensions of 
this response: the impact of output shocks on the rate of unemployment (resilience), and the speed of recovery 
(persistence) of unemployment following a shock.  By estimating a “dynamic” Okun regression relating output 
and unemployment gaps changes , we show that the Eurozone countries lie  on a trade-off between resilience 
and persistence. Countries that are characterized by more resilience typically show more unemployment 
persistence. Furthermore, we show that a country’s position along the trade-off is related to the characteristics 
of its labor and product markets institutions. We find that more regulated product and labor markets (less 
“flexible”) tend to cushion employment in the short-run (more resilience) but lead to slower recovery (more 
persistence) in the medium term. Among Southern European countries, Spain and Italy exemplify two extreme 
cases, Italy representing an example of high short-run resilience and high medium-run persistence (“rigid” 
labor and “regulated” product markets), and Spain representing the opposite case of “flexible” markets, with 
large impact but fast recovery.  
This finding is important in the general discussion of the effects of reforms on society’s welfare, since with 
“flexible” markets,  consumers, workers and firms may suffer from large employment and output volatility, but 
may benefit from faster recovery.  It has also strong implications for the debate on structural reforms: have the 
labor and product market reforms hastily implemented during the crisis in Southern European countries 
aggravated the employment consequences of their fiscal consolidation? Our estimates suggest that they did, 
but we find that the effect is small and short-lived. On impact, structural reforms account for about one extra 
percentage point rise in the unemployment gap in Greece, and for even less in other Southern European 
countries. However, we find that the reforms have contributed to a faster recovery from unemployment with 
positive effects materializing  after two years. 
The plan of the paper is the following. In Section 2 we review the relevant literature. In Section 3 and 4 we 
present some stylized facts on the unemployment and output dynamics as well on the structural reforms 
implemented in the Eurozone countries, focusing on the labor and product markets. In Section 5 we report the 
estimation results, and in Section 6 we use them in order to measure the consequences of structural reforms 
on the unemployment rate. Section 7 concludes the chapter. 
2. A Brief Literature Review  
This paper brings together three different strands of literature. The first is the literature on the “causes and 
persistence” of high unemployment rates in Europe, dating back from the early 80’s, when Europe, unlike the 
US, suffered from a prolonged period of high unemployment, and when the term “Euro-sclerosis” became 
fashionable. The early contributions highlighted the role of macroeconomic shocks, such as the oil crises (see 
Bruno and Sachs, 1985);  the literature that followed focused on features of the labor market such as  the wage 
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bargaining process, the role of unions and “insiders”, and “hysteresis”, e.g. the persistence of high 
unemployment following transitory shocks. Labor market institutions that are associated to high firing and 
hiring costs, are discussed for example in Bentolila and Bertola (2001): they may cushion employment from 
negative shocks in the short run, but may also slow down the employment recovery, as firms are less willing to 
hire in good times if they cannot shed labor in bad times. Similarly, a wage bargaining system where insiders 
play an important role in determining the wage rate, and where the wage rate is largely independent of firms’ 
productivity and of unemployment, may be associated to real wage rigidity and to high and persistent 
unemployment rates (see the “hysteresis” effect discussed in Blanchard and Summers 1986).  A centralized 
wage bargaining may have ambiguous effect on labor market outcomes: either a very centralized or a very 
decentralized system may in principle achieve wage moderation and deliver lower/less persistent 
unemployment, either via coordination or via competition (see Calmfors and Driffill 1987).  More recently, the 
role of labor market institutions such as employment protection legislation has come to the fore (see Blanchard 
2001 and 2006 for a discussion). An impulse to this literature has come from the OECD, who has provided new 
indicators and new evidence for the importance of the institutions of the labor and product market in 
developed economies (see OECD Employment Outlook 2004, 2015, and Conway P. and G. Nicoletti 2006). 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2001), argue that the interaction of the product and labor markets play an important 
role. Lower barriers to entry may raise the equilibrium number of firms, reduce their market power and lead to 
more employment in the long run; product market deregulation may also reduce the rents that are shared by 
firms and unions, so that the latter may have a weaker incentive to bargain for a higher wage. 
The second strand of relevant literature concerns the effects of “structural reforms” in developing and 
developed countries. Early contributions discuss episodes of liberalizations in Asia, Africa, Latin America and in 
the ex-Soviet Republics. Eicher and Schreiber (2010) suggest that pro-market reforms introduced in the 90’s in 
transition countries, such as deregulation in the product market, privatization of state assets and services, 
removal of state-fixed pricing, the creation of a private financial sector, the introduction of competition in the 
banking sector and of an effective system of prudential supervision, were positively associated to growth. 
Eslava et al. (2004), find that social security, labor and financial markets reform introduced in Colombia in the 
‘90s had a positive effect on Total Factor Productivity.  Ospina and Schiffbauers (2010), suggest that product 
market reforms in emerging markets have substantially raised productivity growth, as much as 12 percent in 
some countries. For industrialized countries, Alesina et al. (2005) argue that product market reforms such as 
the reduction of entry barriers and privatization tend to raise investment; Griffith and Harrison (2004), find 
positive effects on employment. Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005), find that reducing the Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL) in the labor market stimulates employment and labor force participation.  
 
Some studies find evidence that structural reforms may involve short-run costs in terms of negative growth 
rate or unemployment. For example, pro-market reforms have short-terms costs with regard to lower growth 
during the initial year, but promote growth from the second year onwards in transition countries (see Staehr, 
2005). Similarly, Cacciatore et al. (2015), for developed countries, find that lower firing costs and lower entry 
barriers reduce initially the entry of firms in the product market and lead to large layoffs of the least productive 
workers in the short run. A number of studies find that labor market liberalizations have negative effects on 
employment, when they are introduced during unfavorable economic conditions. This holds for cuts in  
unemployment benefit, (see Bouis et al. 2012 and IMF WEO  2015), and for reforms in the employment 
protection legislation, EPL (see IMF WEO 2015). 
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The third strand of literature that is relevant for our paper concerns the relationship between unemployment 
and output changes, the so-called Okun law. The Okun Law is a simple reduced-form equation which posits an 
empirical relationship between the change in unemployment and the change in output. For the US, the typical 
rule-of-thumb is that a 1% fall of GDP relative to potential output is associated to 0,5% rise in the 
unemployment rate (see Mankiw 2012). Many authors have questioned the stability of this relationship over 
time, claiming for example that the recent recovery in the US was a “job-less recovery”( see Gordon 2011, 
Cazes et al. 2011, and IMF 2010). However, recent evidence finds that this relationship is remarkably stable 
over the past decades, and holds significantly in many countries (see Ball et al. 2013). Interestingly, this latter 
study finds that the Okun law’s parameters appear quite different across countries, but admittedly fails in 
providing a convincing explanation of these differences in terms of different labor market institutions.  
Our analysis brings these strands of research together, and focuses on the role of labor and product market 
institutions in explaining the cross-country heterogeneity described in the preceding section. We frame the 
discussion of structural reforms in the Okun “tradition”, and we add an element of dynamics in order to 
describe the impact and the persistence of output shocks on the rate of unemployment in different countries. 
Our results give a rationale for the finding that labor and product market reforms may be associated to 
employment losses  and may involve short run costs. Moreover, we give an explanation for the different 
response of unemployment in the Eurozone, during the recent crisis.  We find that the characteristics of the 
labor and product markets such as the centralization of wage bargaining, employment protection, and  the 
degree of product market competition affect the resilience of labor markets to output shocks: more 
“protected” labor and product markets  tend to shelter employment from these shocks; however, these same 
features are associated to a slower “speed of adjustment”, so that the employment recovery from a recession 
is slower the more protected are labor and product markets. 
 
3. Stylized Facts on Unemployment and Output in the Eurozone 
 
This section presents some stylized facts on the labor market response of Eurozone countries to  the crisis. 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the unemployment gap, the deviation of the unemployment rate from the 
equilibrium “non - accelerating (wage) - inflation unemployment rate (NAWRU)”, and the GDP gap, the 
difference between the actual and “potential” GDP”, for Eurozone countries between 1965 and 2014. The 
NAWRU is defined as the rate of unemployment that is consistent with stable wages and with an economy that 
is working at its potential level of output. A positive gap implies that the unemployment rate is above 
equilibrium level. Regarding the output gap, a negative number denotes an economy operating below potential 
GDP, which is the level of output consistent with projected productivity growth and historical factor utilization. 
The two definitions are consistent, so that in principle when output is at potential, e.g. the output gap is  zero, 
the unemployment rate should be at the NAWRU level, so that also the unemployment gap should be zero. The 
methodology adopted for the gaps’ calculations is somewhat controversial. The problem is that potential 
output is pro-cyclical, e.g. it tends to fall in a downturn: low investment leads to low capital and reduces 
estimates of potential output. Thus, when real GDP falls, potential output also falls and the output gap under-
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estimates the size of the recession. Our results are not affected, however, if this error of measurement affects 
in a comparable way both the output and the unemployment gaps. In the empirical section we will use both 
the gaps measures as well as the changes in the unemployment rate and in (the log of) GDP, with similar 
results. Here we focus on the output and unemployment gaps mainly  for two reasons: first because we want 
to compare our results with those in the literature, where they are  commonly used (see for example Gordon 
2011); secondly we are interested in the speed of adjustment to some long-run equilibrium in the labor 
market, and output and unemployment gaps lend themselves to this interpretation. 
Figure 3 shows these gaps for Eurozone countries between 1965 and 2014. A few things emerge quite clearly . 
First, the changes in unemployment(gaps) largely reflect output(gaps) movements: the unemployment gap 
unsurprisingly rises by more in countries that experience larger drops in the output gap. Second, over time the 
two gaps move symmetrically, so that they seem to imply, over time, a stable “Okun Law”.  
Figure 3: Unemployment and Output gaps in the Eurozone 
 
Source: AMECO database 
 
Countries differ markedly as to the size and in the persistence of shocks. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 show the 
peak-to-trough change in the unemployment rate and in GDP, respectively, during the crisis. The numbers 
confirm the visual impression of the previous picture, with unemployment peaks largely reflecting GDP losses. 
In particular Greece, the Baltic Republics, Luxembourg and Malta stand out as the countries that suffered the 
largest GDP losses, about 26% in Greece, 17% in Baltic countries and 13% in Luxembourg and Malta; the rise in 
unemployment rate was particularly severe in Greece, Spain and in the Baltic Republics. It was surprisingly 
muted in Luxembourg and Malta.  
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The last column of the table shows another interesting measure of the  labor markets response to the recent 
crisis: the average elasticity of the rate of unemployment to output. This is calculated by simply dividing 
column 1 by column 2 (with the minus sign).  
 
Table 1: GDP and unemployment losses in Eurozone countries, 2008-2014
 
Source: AMECO database 
The largest elasticity of unemployment to GDP is found in Spain, 1.72, followed by Cyprus, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Ireland which are close to unity; the lowest unemployment elasticity to GDP is found in Malta and 
Luxembourg (0.07, and 0.10 respectively).  In the following section we will refer to “resilience” to indicate that 
unemployment in a particular country shows a relatively small elasticity to GDP changes.  In the next section 
we will discuss another feature of national labor markets, unemployment “persistence”.  By this we mean  a 
country’s relatively slow adjustment of unemployment following an output shock.. 
 
 
4. Resilience and Persistence: Econometric Analysis  
Our aim here is to measure the speed of recovery of the unemployment rate following a shock in different 
countries of the Euro area, and to relate this to “resilience”.  We will show that typically labor markets that are 
more “resilient” following a shock are also slower to recover. In order to do so, we estimate an Okun-type 
relationship separately for 19 countries in the Eurozone, using OECD annual data from 1965 to 2014. We focus 
on the cross-country differences in the parameters. The next step will be to relate these parameters to 
country-specific labor and product market characteristics.  
Austria 1.50 -5.92 0.25
Belgium 1.50 -5.77 0.26
Cyprus 12.40 -10.79 1.15
Estonia 11.20 -17.48 0.64
Finland 2.30 -8.27 0.28
France 2.90 -4.90 0.59
Germany 2.60 -9.41 0.28
Greece 19.70 -26.24 0.75
Ireland 8.30 -9.15 0.91
Ita ly 6.00 -8.08 0.74
Latvia 11.80 -17.59 0.67
Li thuania 12.00 -16.25 0.74
Luxembourg 1.40 -14.31 0.10
Malta 1.00 -14.99 0.07
Netherlands 3.70 -3.77 0.98
Portugal 7.60 -7.90 0.96
Slovakia 4.90 -12.35 0.40
Slovenia 5.70 -9.57 0.60
Spain 14.80 -8.58 1.72
Country Unemployment Change, peak-trough(1)
GDP Change, peak-trough 
(2)
Unemployment change/GDP change (-1/2)
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Unlike previous studies that only consider the “short run” impact of output on unemployment in the standard 
Okun relationship, we add a minimum amount of dynamics so as to evaluate speed of adjustment towards the 
long run equilibrium (the parameter α below). For each country separately we estimate the following model: 
(1)     𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑝 = 𝛽𝑖(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑝
) + 𝛼𝑖 (𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1
𝑝 ) +  𝑣𝑖𝑡          𝑖 = 1. . 𝐶,       𝑡 = 1, . . 𝑇 
where 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is unemployment rate at time t=1..T in country i=1..C , 𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the logarithm of real GDP of country i at 
time t, 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑝
 is the NAWRU, 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑝
 the log of potential real GDP, and  𝑣𝑖𝑡  denotes a stochastic disturbance term at 
time t  for country i. Equation (1)  says that the deviation of the unemployment rate from the “equilibrium” 
level, the unemployment gap, depends on the “cyclical” deviation of output from potential, the output gap,  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑝
, and on the lagged unemployment gap. A long-run equilibrium in this model occurs when 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑝
, 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑝  for all t. In order to check the robustness of our result we also estimate a different specification 
where the first difference in the unemployment rate and the rate of growth of output replaces the 
corresponding gaps (see Appendix). The coefficient 𝛽𝑖 , which is negative a-priori, measures  the impact of 
deviations of output from potential on unemployment gaps in each country: the smaller this parameter is, the 
more resilient is the country’s unemployment rate to output shocks;  parameter 𝛼𝑖,  which should be less than 
one in absolute value for stability reasons, measures the persistence of the unemployment response. The 
closer this parameter is to one in absolute value, the more persistent is the unemployment deviation from the 
equilibrium, i.e. the slowest the return to the equilibrium following a shock. In the limit where|𝛼𝑖| = 1 , a 
temporary shock has permanent consequences on unemployment (“hysteresis”). This specification allows us to 
calculate statistics such as the time required for unemployment to adjust, say, half-way, back to its long run 
equilibrium. This is simply given by the expression 𝑇∗(𝑖) = −
ln (2)
ln (𝛼𝑖)
 .3This statistic considers a purely temporary 
and idiosyncratic unemployment shock, e.g. one that lasts only one period and does not affect output directly. 
Thus, it clearly underestimates the actual persistence of unemployment in a country, since typically shocks, e.g. 
fiscal ones, are long lasting and affect output and the labor market at the same time. Nevertheless, this is a 
useful indicator for assessing how national labor markets respond to the same hypothetical shock. The 
indicator is increasing in 𝛼𝑖  , the persistence parameter, and tends to infinity as 𝛼𝑖 tends to one.  
Table 3 2 shows the estimates for the impact (𝛽𝑖) and the persistence ( 𝛼𝑖) parameters, obtained by country-
by-country regression using OLS, over the period 1965-2015. These parameters are significantly different from 
zero, and have the expected sign in all countries (the parameter 𝛼𝑖 is not statistically different from zero only in 
Malta). We have checked that the parameters are stable through the decades, and we can reject the presence 
of structural breaks when we consider subsamples starting in 1975, 1985, 1995, and 2005 for all countries. The 
table illustrates the heterogeneity of “Okun laws” across the Eurozone. 
 
                                                          
3 This formula can be derived as follows: consider an initial situation where the unemployment rate and output are at their 
equilibrium values, and a temporary shock at time 0, v0 ,raises the unemployment rate. After T periods the unemployment 
rate will deviate from its natural level by 𝛼𝑇𝑣0. Provided |𝛼| < 1,  the rate of unemployment will have converged half-way 
back to the equilibrium at time T*, where T* satisfies 𝛼𝑇∗𝑣0 =
1
2
𝑣0. Simplifying and taking logs gives the expression in the 
text. 
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                                                    Table  2: Okun Coefficients in the Eurozone (Gap regression) 
country beta alpha Half_way_time 
Austria 0.132*** 0.479*** 0.942 
Belgium 0.286*** 0.523*** 1.069 
Cyprus 0.454*** 0.409*** 0.775 
Estonia 0.233*** 0.426*** 0.812 
Finland 0.348*** 0.555*** 1.177 
France 0.24*** 0.682*** 1.811 
Germany 0.233*** 0.582*** 1.281 
Greece 0.246*** 0.702*** 1.959 
Ireland 0.228*** 0.524*** 1.073 
Italy 0.126*** 0.885*** 5.674 
Latvia 0.474*** 0.247*** 0.496 
Lithuania 0.498*** 0.255** 0.507 
Luxembourg 0.033** 0.619*** 1.445 
Malta 0.107** 0.101 0.302 
Netherlands 0.332*** 0.48*** 0.944 
Portugal 0.134*** 0.542*** 1.132 
Slovakia 0.49*** 0.36*** 0.678 
Slovenia 0.184*** 0.663*** 1.687 
Spain 0.493*** 0.515*** 1.045 
Notes: alpha in absolute value. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Source:   
Authors’ calculations. 
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Consistently with the peak to-trough elasticities previously reported, the estimated impact effect of the cyclical 
output gap on the unemployment gap is large in Spain, Cyprus, and in the “new” Euro members such as Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Slovakia. In these countries a one percent output fall relative to potential is associated, within a 
year, to about half of a percent rise in the unemployment gap, similarly to the “standard” estimates obtained 
for the US; conversely, the unemployment response is very small in Malta, Luxembourg and Austria, as well as 
in the other Mediterranean countries such as Italy Portugal and Greece.  
Interestingly, many of the countries in the first group, the least “resilient”, show a relatively fast rebound of 
unemployment (a small estimate in absolute value for 𝛼𝑖). This is true for Spain, Cyprus, Estonia, and Slovakia , 
where it takes a year or less to halve the initial effect. At the other extreme are Greece, France, Germany, and 
Slovenia, where the persistence of unemployment is very large. Italy has the most sluggish recovery of all, 
taking  4 years and 8 months to revert half way to the initial equilibrium following an hypothetical temporary 
shock. Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between “resilience” and “persistence”. Each country is represented 
by a dot: the coordinates are, on the vertical axis, the estimated β coefficient (in absolute value) representing 
the size of the impact response of unemployment to output; on the horizontal axis, the estimated α coefficient, 
in absolute value, measuring the persistence of the shock. The evidence suggests a trade-off: where the impact 
effect of output on unemployment is smaller (low beta, i.e. high resilience), unemployment is more persistent 
(high alpha).  Malta appears to be an outlier (but remember that the persistence parameter is very imprecisely 
estimated). The correlation and rank correlation between the alpha and the beta (in absolute value) 
coefficients, omitting Malta, are respectively 0.69 (significant at 0.1% percent) and 0.62 (significant at 0.06%). 
Southern Mediterranean countries appear either in the upper-right region of large resilience and persistence 
(Italy, Portugal, and Greece), which is typically associated with “rigid” markets, or in the lower-left region of 
low resilience and persistence (Cyprus and Spain) which is typically associated with “flexible” markets. 
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Figure 4: Trade-off between Resilience (low beta) and persistence (high alpha) 
 
 
The evidence suggests that on average labor markets which are more effective in cushioning employment from 
output shocks, “pay” this in terms of more persistent unemployment. 
In order to assess the robustness of these results, in the Appendix we run an equation which is similar to (1) 
but  where unemployment and output gaps have been replaced with the first time difference of the 
unemployment rate and of log GDP. The results are very similar to those described here. As mentioned above, 
we prefer the “gap” specification since it allows an interpretation of in terms of convergence to a long-run 
equilibrium and it is largely used in the literature. 
5. Product and Labor Market Institutions 
Our next aim  is to understand the role that product and labor market institutions play in this trade-off. We 
want to test the hypothesis that “more regulated” labor and product markets may, on the one hand, cushion 
employment from output shocks, for example preventing lay-offs, insuring labor income,  and limiting 
entry/exit, but may also lead to more “hysteresis”, as wage and price rigidities slow down the employment 
recovery. This section describes the indexes of labor and product market institutions that we use in the 
following econometric analysis. 
For the labor market, we consider the OECD employment protection Legislation index (EPL) and the 
centralization in wage bargaining index, CWB. The EPL is a synthetic measure of the strictness of regulation on 
dismissals and of the diffusion of temporary contracts. In particular, it covers the dismissal notification 
procedures, the delay and length of the notice period, the size of severance payments, the compensation after 
unfair dismissal and the possibility of reinstatement for employees on regular/indefinite contracts (see OECD 
Employment Outlook 2004 and 2015). EPL indicators are generally available since 1985.  
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The CWB indicator is obtained from the Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage 
Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS), see Visser (2015). It describes the predominant level at 
which wage bargaining takes place, and takes into account the frequency of contracts, the importance of the 
clauses of collective agreements and the extent to which local agreement can derogate from them. This 
indicator is a measure of the degree to which wages respond to local conditions (e.g. productivity) or are 
determined by collective bargaining; it is generally available since 1960. 
 
For product market institutions, we employ the OECD index of regulation (see Conway and Nicoletti 2006). The 
index measures the pervasiveness of regulation in seven non-manufacturing industries: electricity and gas 
supply, road freight, air passenger transport, rail transport, post and telecommunications. The index is 
calculated as the arithmetic average of the following sub-indexes: barriers to entry, public ownership, market 
share of new entrants, and price controls. All the indicators, in product and labor markets, take values between 
0 and 6, with higher values corresponding to more regulation. They capture similar features of the respective 
markets and are typically highly correlated. 
 
Figure 5 in panel (a) shows the evolution of the average EPL indicator for the Euro area (red line) together with 
the coefficient of variation, defined as the ratio of the cross-country standard deviation and the average, at a 
point in time (blue line). European labor protection legislations were reformed in two large waves: the first 
occurred in the early 1990s, when the average EPL shows a marked decline, and the second in the early years 
of the crisis, stating in 2008. Interestingly, in both episodes the move towards a more competitive model 
implied a significant convergence of European labor market institutions, as shown by the fall in the coefficient 
of variation. Figure 6, panel (a), shows that in both episodes this dynamics was mainly due to the convergence 
of southern European countries’ legislations to that of the other countries. The dismantling of employment 
protection legislation was particularly rapid and sizable during the recent crisis, possibly as a counterpart to the 
financial assistance obtained from the European and International Institutions. Similarly, the process of 
decentralization of wage bargaining started in the 1990s, see Figure 5 (b). Following the first wave of reforms 
of the 1990s the reform effort of Southern European countries stalled until the crisis, so that the cross-country 
differences in the degree of centralization in wage bargaining remained quite high, see the blue line.  Reforms 
and convergence re-appeared only in the most recent period. 
Product market deregulation also accelerated in the 1990s, following the adoption of Maastricht treaty, the 
European Single Market Program, and the European Monetary Union (see Boeri 2005).  Figure 7 shows that, 
unlike in the employment protection legislation, there was little convergence in the Eurozone until 2008. As  
product markets were liberalized over time, cross-countries differences, captured by the cross-country 
standard deviation (not shown) were stable until 2007: the rise in the coefficient of variation simply reflects the 
fall in the mean product market index  (in the denominator). In fact, unlike labor markets, product markets in 
Southern Europe in the wake of the crisis were already quite similar to those of the rest of the Eurozone, see 
Figure 8 
14 
 
 Figure 5: Labor Markets in the Euro Area 
                      (a) Employment Protection                                                     (b) Centralized Wage Bargaining 
 
Source: OECD 
 
 
Figure 6: Labor Markets in Southern Europe 
           (a) Mean Employment Protection                                              (b) Mean Centralized Wage Bargaining 
 
Source: OECD 
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Figure 7: Product Market Regulation in the Euro Area 
                                                                               
 
 
 
Figure 8: Product Market Regulation in Southern Europe  
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5.1 Measuring the Role of Labor and Product Market institutions  
In this section we want to evaluate the role of labor and product market institutions in explaining the 
persistence/resilience trade-off. We adopt the following empirical strategy. We assume that the country-
specific resilience and persistence coefficients 𝛽𝑖𝑡 and  𝛼𝑖𝑡 depend on “country-specific” characteristics of the 
labor and product market that may change over-time when reforms are implemented. These include the 
indexes of employment protection, centralized wage bargaining and product market regulation. These 
characteristics are summarized by the generic indicator(s), INDit In addition, the parameters may depend on 
some common factors, summarized by 𝛽0 𝑎𝑛𝑑𝛼0 below: 
(2)             𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0+𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡    𝛼𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡−1 .  
We also allow for the possibility that our labor and product market  indicator(s)  may  exert a direct effect on 
the  unemployment gap, over and above that on the resilience and persistence parameters. There,fore, we 
include them in the model of equation (1)  Substituting : 
 
(3)  𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑝 = (𝛽0+𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡)(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑝) + (𝛼0+𝛼1IND𝑖𝑡−1)(𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1
𝑝 ) + (𝑐0+𝑐1IND𝑖𝑡)  +  𝑣𝑖𝑡  
As before, our labor and product market  indicators  take the value of zero for the “most competitive” case and 
increase when markets become more heavily regulated.  We expect some persistence in unemployment, i.e. 
0 ≤ 𝛼0 < 1 and that positive output gaps should negatively affect unemployment gaps, 𝛽0 < 0 .  Also, a priori 
the values of  both interaction parameters 𝛽1 and 𝛼1  should be positive. This would imply for example that a 
more “rigid” labor market (higher value for IND) is associated with more resilience, e.g. a lower impact  of 
output  on the unemployment gap (in absolute terms) and withhigher persistence/slower recovery  of the  
unemployment rate. We estimate equation (3) using generalized least squares (GLS) with random effects. We 
include time (year)-fixed effects but not country-fixed effects, since the latter are already captured by the 
structural indicators. The results obtained with country fixed effects are very similar and available upon 
request.  
Table 3 presents the results.  We start by including in the model one  indicator at a time, in order to avoid 
collinearity problems and tor preserve the sample size. Collinearity stems from the fact that when reforms 
occur they tend to apply to many markets.  Later on we will include more indicators simultaneously. Column 1 
presents the baseline regression of the simple unemployment gap on a lag and on the output gap. The 
estimated coefficients for the GDP gap and the lagged unemployment gap are statistically significant with the 
expected signs. A one percent rise in the GDP gap is associated with a 0.24 percent decline in unemployment 
gap. This value is similar to the average of the individual coefficients estimated previously, country by country.  
In addition, a one percent increase in the lagged unemployment gap carries over to a 0.63 percent rise after 
one period.  
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Table 3: Modified Okun law regressions (dependent variable: unemployment gap) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 
GDP gap -0.241*** -0.587*** -0.467*** -0.352*** -0.596*** 
 (0.043) (0.063) (0.107) (0.076) (0.075) 
      
Unemployment gap (t-1) 0.627*** 0.540*** 0.384*** 0.341*** 0.434*** 
 (0.061) (0.058) (0.144) (0.086) (0.097) 
      
PMR  0.041   0.050 
  (0.050)   (0.052) 
      
GDP gap*PMR  0.078***   0.078*** 
  (0.014)   (0.020) 
      
Unemployment gap (t-1)*PMR  0.034***   0.018 
  (0.010)   (0.011) 
      
EPL   -0.009   
   (0.032)   
      
GDP gap*EPL   0.050   
   (0.030)   
      
Unemployment gap (t-1)*EPL   0.107*   
   (0.060)   
      
CWB    -0.060*** -0.036* 
    (0.023) (0.019) 
      
GDP gap*CWB    0.035* 0.001 
    (0.018) (0.020) 
      
Unemployment gap (t-1)*CWB    0.100*** 0.045* 
    (0.021) (0.023) 
      
Constant -0.422*** -0.495** -0.158 -0.190 -0.355* 
 (0.139) (0.209) (0.144) (0.131) (0.213) 
Observations 728 499 347 677 494 
R2 ? ? ? ? ? 
Note:. All regressions are estimated with Random Effects with year fixed effects. *=significant at 10%, **= 
significant at 5%, ***=significant at 1% 
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The second column adds the product market regulation index (PMR) and its interactions with the output and 
lagged unemployment gaps to the explanatory variables. Relative to the first regression ,the output gap 
coefficient becomes larger (-0.587 against -0.241) in absolute value, while the persistence coefficient is 
somewhat reduced. The first effect is due to the fact that introducing the PMR index allows for the 
heterogeneity among countries. The “total” impact effect of the output gap on the unemployment gap now 
equals -0.587+0.078*PMR, which takes the largest value (-0.587) for the least regulated (PMR=0) market, and 
the smallest value  (= -0.12) for the most regulated one (PMR=6), confirming our a priori that a more regulated 
market is associated to a more “resilient” labor market. The PMR interaction with the lagged unemployment 
gap shows that a more regulated market is characterized by higher unemployment persistence (the 𝛼 
parameters now can take values in the range of 0.54+0.034*6= 0.74 for the theoretically most regulated 
product market, corresponding to a half-time adjustment 𝑇∗(𝑖) =2.3 years, to 𝛼 =0.54 for the least regulated, 
implying 𝑇∗(𝑖) =1.1 years). Conversely, the PMR has no significant independent effect on the level of the 
unemployment gap.  
The third column shows the results for the employment protection legislation (EPL) indicator. This index is not 
available for many years so that the number of observations shrinks from 728 in the first regression to only 
347. The table shows that the EPL interaction term with the lagged unemployment gap is large and statistically 
significant (at 10 percent confidence),  implying that employment protection has a potentially very large effect 
on perisistence. A country with the smallest possible degree of labor regulation (EPL=0) would take 
𝑇∗(𝑖) =0.72 years to revert half-way to equilibrium following a unit temporary shock to unemployment, 
compared to 𝑇∗(𝑖) = 32 years (!) for the (theoretically) most regulated country (EPL=6)). The estimates do not 
show any significant effect of EPL  on either the resilience parameter, the  𝛽1 coefficient in equation (3), nor a 
significant EPL level effect on the dependent variable. Thus, this result implies that a labor legislation more 
oriented to employment protection is associated with a higher duration of unemployment but does not 
significantly “protect” the labor market from demand shocks in the short run.  
In column 4 we report the results for the index of centralized wage bargaining, CWB. A more centralized 
system is associated with a lower impact of the output on the unemployment gap. In fact, the impact effect is 
lowest (-0.14 percent =-0.352+0.035*6) for the most centralized bargaining system, and largest for the most 
decentralized one (- 0.352). On the other hand, consistently with the previous results, a more centralized 
bargaining system is associated with larger persistence of the unemployment gap. The coefficient of the CWB-
unemployment-gap interaction is positive and sizable (0.1), and implies that the half-time adjustment ranges 
from 0.64 years for theoretically least centralized system (CWB=0) to 11 years for the most centralized one 
(CWB=6). Unlike other indicators, the level of CWB is significantly and negatively associated with the  
unemployment gap. 
Finally, column 5 shows the estimates obtained when we add the product market indicator PMR together with 
the centralized bargaining indicator CWB (we do not include EPL indicator because of collinearity problems and 
lack of observations). We find that higher regulation of the product market, PMR, increases resilience by  
reducing the output  effect on unemployment exactly by the same amount found in the previous regression in 
column (2), while the CWB index raises again the persistence effect, although by less than previously 
estimated, compare columns (4) and (5).   
In the Appendix we repeat the analysis using a specification that replaces unemployment and output gaps with 
their first/log differences, respectively (see Table A2). We obtain coefficients of the same sign as those 
discussed, but the estimates of the lagged unemployment interactions, measuring the persistence effect, are 
less precise (have p-values higher than 10 percent). In the case of the last model of column 5, this alternative 
specification has “wrong”, e.g. negative, sign for the CWB-lagged unemployment interaction. 
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Summarizing, we find that the persistence-resilience trade-off in unemployment that we have documented in 
the previous section can be meaningfully explained by the different national labor and product market 
institutions of the Euro-area’s countries. More regulated markets tend to display   higher resilience, e.g. a lower  
response  of unemployment to output shocks , and higher  persistence of unemployment. 
 
6. The Estimated Effects of Structural Reforms on Unemployment in Southern Europe 
Given the book’s focus on structural reforms in Southern European countries, one important question is 
whether the structural reforms hastily introduced by these countries during the crisis have affected, over and 
above the austerity measures, the size and persistence of the unemployment rate. In order to answer this 
question we adopt the following methodology. We calculate the predicted unemployment gap (estimated from 
the regression in column 5, in Table 3), assuming that both the output gap and the structural indicators take 
their actual  realizations, the latter reflecting  the effects of structural reform; we compare these values with 
those obtained calculating  a “counterfactual” unemployment gap,  that is  obtained   for the same values of 
the output gaps, when the structural indicators are frozen  at their 2007 values, in a “no reform” scenario. The 
difference between the predicted and counter-factual unemployment gap gives an imperfect measure of the 
impact of structural reforms on unemployment gaps that is not affected by other policy measures, such as 
fiscal policy, that mostly affect the labor market through output  (note that these calculations assume that 
structural reforms do not directly affect  actual and potential output).  
Greece 
Some of the reforms recently implemented in Greece are described in this book’s Chapter 8 Figure  9 shows the 
results of our counter-factual analysis. The indexes of  product market regulation and  wage centralization are 
shown in Panel a, while Panel b shows the difference between the predicted (“with reforms”) and the 
counterfactual (“no-reforms”) unemployment gap. We see that the product market reforms that occurred 
since the crisis are not as substantial as those of the labor market (see Manasse, 2015 for a discussion). 
Conversely, the large wave of labor market deregulation occurring in 2010 is associated with a large increase in 
the actual unemployment relative to the counterfactual, with a differential reaching 1.1 percentage points in 
2011. According to our previous results, this reflects the fact that the reforms reduced the resilience of the 
labor market by raising the impact of output shocks on unemployment. However, we also see that as soon as 
2013 the differential turns negative, suggesting that a “positive” effect of the reforms eventually kicks in, by 
reducing the unemployment persistence. While these effects are not large, the actual and counterfactual 
unemployment gaps are found significantly different in mean.  
Italy  
Figure 10 shows that the labor market reforms that were introduced in 2009 were quite timid and gradual and 
some liberalization of product markets  occured  in the same years, although far less effective than in the other 
countries considered here. The effect was to raise the actual level of unemployment by a tenth of a percentage 
point (these estimates do not include the “jobs act” labor reform introduced in Italy only in 2014-15). At the 
same time there is no “catching-up” so that there appears to be little positive effects in terms of gained speed 
of recovery. 
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Figure 9: Reforms and Unemployment: Greece 
Panel (a): CWB and PMR indicators Panel (b): Difference (Actual and 
Counterfactual) Unemployment 
   
 
Figure  10: Reforms and Unemployment: Italy 
 
Panel (a): CWB and PMR indicators Panel (b): Difference  between  predicted   
Actual  and Counterfactual Unemployment  
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Figure 11: Reforms and Unemployment: Portugal 
Panel (a): CWB and PMR indicators Panel (b Difference  between  predicted  
Actual  and Counterfactual Unemployment 
  
 
Figure  12: Reforms and Unemployment: Spain 
Panel (a): CWB and PMR indicators Panel (b): Difference  between  predicted  
Actual  and Counterfactual Unemployment 
   
 
Portugal: 
The main labour market reforms implemented in Portugal are described in Chapter 6 of this book. Figure 11 
shows the evolution of market regulation indicators as well as the actual and counterfactual unemployment 
gap in Portugal. The index of product market regulation declines steadily since 2008, while only in 2012, as a 
consequence of reforms, we observe a sharp decline of the wage centralization index, CWB. The estimated 
effects are relatively small: for 2012 we estimate  an increase of the actual relative to the counterfactual 
unemployment rate of about a tenth of a percentage point. The difference is short lasting and almost 
disappears  one year later. 
 
 
Spain: 
The main labour reforms implemented in Spain are described in Chapter 7.  These reforms show up in a 
significant reduction on the index of centralization of wage bargaining, first in 2008 and later in 2011, while 
product market reforms result in a more gradual decline  in the index of regulation since 2007, see   Figure 12, 
left panel. The right panel of the figure shows that in  correspondence with the reforms the unemployment gap 
slightly rises above that of the no-reform scenario, by about a tenth of a percentage point, but already in 2013 
the effect is reversed and the unemployment rate falls below that of the no-reform scenario.  
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 Southern European countries went through a very painful process of fiscal consolidation, debt and bank 
restructuring, credit squeeze and recession, and, under pressure from creditors, started an ambitious and 
politically sensitive program of reforms stretching from the public sector to credit, labor, and product markets. 
These countries experienced their worst recession since WWII, with unemployment soaring to unprecedented 
levels. The jury is still out on the role of austerity. Opinions differ also on the role structural reforms( see the 
discussion in the introductory chapter of this book). Some for example, consider that the reforms were 
insufficient, not fully implemented, or were not fully credible, while other critics blame them for being too 
radical,  unfocused, wrongly sequenced, or counter-productive in terms of the short run effects on the 
economy. Given that many adverse shocks were affecting these economies at the same time, it not easy to 
isolate the role, if any, of the reforms.  
 And yet while unemployment soared in all Southern European countries during the crisis, the impact of the 
output squeeze on the labor market as well as the persistence of high unemployment rates differed sharply 
among countries, with Spain and Cyprus displaying the largest short run elasticity of unemployment to output, 
but also the fastest speed of adjustment, and the opposite in Greece, Italy and Portugal.  
 In this paper we analyze the response of the labor markets in the Eurozone. First, we document two important 
aspects of this response: the resilience of unemployment to output shocks, and the persistence of shocks to 
unemployment.  We find that most countries of the Eurozone lie on a trade-off between resilience and 
persistence: countries where the rate of unemployment is less affected on impact, displaying thus higher 
resilience, typically also show higher unemployment persistence.  
In order to isolate the effects of structural reforms on the working of the labor market, we investigate 
empirically the role of employment protection, centralization of wage bargaining  and of product market 
institutions, in affecting unemployment as well as its dynamic response to shocks. We find evidence that more 
protected labor and product markets are characterized by more resilience at the expense of greater 
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persistence, while more competitive markets make employment more vulnerable to output shocks but also 
experience a faster recovery.  
We estimate how much product and labor market reforms may have contributed to the rise of unemployment 
in Southern Europe, and/or to the faster/slower recovery, by comparing projection of unemployment gaps  
with an artificial counterfactual of no-reform, obtained by freezing labor and product markets to their pre-2008 
situation.  For Greece we find that the front-loaded labor market reforms introduced since 2010 account for 
one (extra) percentage point rise in the unemployment gap. The effect for other Southern European countries 
are smaller, also in the light of the less pronounced reforms implemented since 2008. The case for Greece is 
interesting because we also find that the reforms significantly entail a faster recovery relative to the counter-
factual scenario, so that after only  two years the rate of unemployment becomes lower and more rapidly 
falling than in the absence of reforms. This is true, although to a lesser extent, also for the other South 
European countries.  
To some extent these results should not come as a surprise: the crisis that hit Southern European countries was 
unprecedented, summing the effects of harsh fiscal consolidations, sudden stops and current account 
reversals, wage deflation, sovereign and banks’ defaults leading to credit crunches and ending in the worst 
recession of the post war era. Employment and unemployment changes were, to a first degree, driven by these 
factors. Our analysis has shown that degree of product and labor market competition can significantly affect 
the short-run resilience and the medium-run persistence of unemployment in these economies.   
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APPENDIX: An alternative specification 
In order to check for the robustness of our results we estimate an alternative specification for our model, 
summarized by equations (1). This replaces the unemployment gap and the (log) output gap with their 
respective first differences:  
(1𝑎)     𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝛽𝑖(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛼𝑖(𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡−2 ) + 𝑣𝑖𝑡          𝑖 = 1. . 𝐶,       𝑡 = 1, . . 𝑇 
Table A1 shows the impact, and persistence parameters based on estimating equation (1a) country by country. 
Table A1. Okun Coefficients in the Eurozone (Difference regression) 
country beta_19652015 alpha_19652015 Half_way 
Austria 0.12*** 0.08 0.28 
Belgium 0.24*** 0.43*** 0.81 
Cyprus 0.35*** 0.36*** 0.67 
Estonia 0.38*** 0.29*** 0.56 
Finland 0.31*** 0.49*** 0.97 
France 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.54 
Germany 0.23*** 0.44*** 0.85 
Greece 0.11*** 0.61*** 1.39 
Ireland 0.24*** 0.21 0.44 
Italy 0.15*** 0.50*** 1.00 
Latvia 0.20*** 0.27 0.54 
Lithuania 0.14*** 0.16 0.38 
Luxembourg 0.03*** 0.20 0.43 
Malta 0.12*** 0.00   
Netherlands 0.28*** 0.19* 0.42 
Portugal 0.15*** 0.40*** 0.76 
Slovakia 0.40*** 0.20 0.43 
Slovenia 0.16*** 0.46*** 0.89 
Spain 0.47*** 0.18* 0.40 
Notes: Alpha in absolute value. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. Source:   
Authors’ calculations. 
 
In this specification, countries differences in the impact and persistence parameters are less pronounced than 
before, but still exhibit a trade-off. According to Table A1, the impact of output change on unemployment 
change is highest in Spain, Slovakia, Estonia and Cyprus where a 1 percent output fall relative to previous 
period is associated, within a year, to about 0.40 of a percent rise in the unemployment difference. The 
response of unemployment is lowest in Luxembourg, Greece, Austria and Italy. It is also interesting to see that 
Greece and Italy are also the countries where unemployment rebounds relatively slowly (High 𝛼𝑖). In Greece, it 
takes more than a year to halve the unemployment shock, whereas in Italy it takes exactly one year. 
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The “trade-off” picture corresponding to these new estimates  shown in Figure A1.  
Figure A1: Trade-off between impact and persistence (difference regression) 
 
 
In the new specification, the countries are less heterogeneous in terms of their impact and persistence 
coefficients. Some countries (Austria, Lithuania and Luxembourg in addition to Malta) seem to lie off the trade-
off curve. However, countries like Spain Slovakia Cyprus, and Finland still appear as displaying among the 
largest impact and the smallest persistence coefficients, as with our previous model; similarly, Italy, Slovenia, 
Portugal and Greece continue to be characterized by very large persistence and very low impact effects. After 
removing the countries which have insignificant alpha coefficient, we obtain a correlation and rank correlation 
between the new estimated parameters which are similar to the previous ones, respectively 0.65 (significant at 
4%) and 0.61 (significant at 6%).   
Table A2 contains the estimation results of the second step, where we consider all countries jointly, and allow 
the coefficients to depend on labor and product market indicators. In practice here we use the specification 
with first differences, equation (1a) above, together with equation (2) and estimate the following equation: 
(1b?)  𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 = (𝛽0+𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡)(𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1) + (𝛼0+𝛼1IND𝑖𝑡−1)(𝑢𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡−2) + (𝑐0+𝑐1IND𝑖𝑡)  +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 
 As in the previous analysis, we start without any market indicator in column 1. The result is that GDP growth 
and lag unemployment change have respectively significant negative and positive impacts on unemployment 
change. We introduce PMR indicator in column 2. It appears that greater rigidity in the product market 
decreases the impact of economic growth on the unemployment change. However, there is no significant 
relationship between PMR and unemployment persistence. Column 3 shows that the coefficients of EPL 
become insignificant at the standard confidence levels. Regarding the CWB, we find in column 4 that CWB 
rigidity tends to reduce the impact effect of output growth on unemployment. The interaction of CWB with 
lagged unemployment is of the expected positive sign, so that rigidity raises persistence, but it is only 
28 
 
marginally significant (0.12 p-value). Also, we find a negative level effect of CWB on the unemployment change. 
We introduce both CWB and PMR in column 5. Here we have that the coefficients of the interaction of PMR 
with GDP growth is positive and significant, suggesting that, as before, a more regulated product market 
alleviates the negative impact of negative GDP shocks. However, the parameter estimate of the interaction of 
the lagged unemployment change-CWB changes sign relative to column (4), now suggesting that a more 
centralized system reduces the unemployment persistence. In general, the new specification with first 
differences has lower p-values relative to “gap” specification.  
 
Table A2: Okun analysis with market indicators (Dependent variable: unemployment change) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 model1 model2 model3 model4 model5 
GDPgrowth  -0.136*** -0.342*** -0.236*** -0.252*** -0.310** 
 (0.022) (0.090) (0.087) (0.056) (0.137) 
      
Unemployment change (t-1) 0.391*** 0.516*** 0.284* 0.263*** 0.619*** 
 (0.039) (0.106) (0.157) (0.089) (0.151) 
      
PMR  0.028   0.015 
  (0.078)   (0.082) 
      
GDPgrowth*PMR  0.044**   0.047** 
  (0.019)   (0.020) 
      
Unemployment change (t-1)*PMR  -0.022   -0.010 
  (0.026)   (0.030) 
      
EPL   -0.012   
   (0.081)   
      
GDPgrowth*EPL   -0.005   
   (0.019)   
      
Unemployment change (t-1)*EPL   0.061   
   (0.066)   
      
CWB     -0.156** 0.035 
    (0.065) (0.074) 
      
GDPgrowthxCWB    0.026* -0.014 
    (0.014) (0.025) 
      
Unemployment change (t-1)xCWB    0.040 -0.049** 
    (0.026) (0.019) 
      
Constant 0.078 -0.120 -0.004 0.500* -0.220 
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 (0.219) (0.301) (0.221) (0.296) (0.270) 
Observations 736 500 347 689 495 
R2      
Note: All regressions are estimated with Random Effects with year fixed effects. *significant at 10%, **= 
significant at 5%, ***=significant at 1% 
 
 
